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The Public Accountant and the Investing Public*  
By Frederick B. Andrews
*A paper read to the National Association of Securities Commissioners at Milwaukee, Wis­
consin, September, 1933.
In recommending to the congress the legislation which has 
since become known as the “federal securities act of 1933,” 
President Roosevelt said:
“What we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of the 
ancient truth that those who manage banks, corporations, and 
other agencies handling or using other people’s money are trustees 
acting for others.”
My purpose is to discuss the function of the public accountant 
in facilitating this trusteeship—to indicate the extent to which 
he may, and beyond which he may not, reasonably be held 
responsible to the investing public. The thesis which I present to 
you is that the public accounting profession has formulated an 
adequate concept of that responsibility and has faithfully dis­
charged it in the largest measure possible under present condi­
tions, that its work may be facilitated if auditors are made di­
rectly responsible to the investing public, and that the investing 
public must not expect too much of the public accountant, as I 
believe in some instances it has.
There has been much loose talk during the past few years, and 
latterly some loose writing, with regard to the reports of certified 
public accountants on companies which have collapsed. Ac­
countants have been talking among themselves, as engineers do 
when a levee breaks, architects when a building collapses or 
lawyers when the criminal statutes conspicuously fail to check a 
“crime wave.” Such talk is not loose; it understands difficulties, 
and if it recognizes shortcomings, it does so with the serious 
purpose of seeking a remedy for them which will not entail other 
evils of perhaps greater magnitude. Emphatically it does not 
constitute a plea of mea culpa.
It would be futile for us to wish to be shielded from the search­
light of criticism, whether by accountants or by laymen. No 
part of our system of public financing can hope to escape inquiry 
after such a debacle as we have witnessed during the past four 
years. It is only when critics wilfully or ignorantly assign to 
certified public accountants burdens of responsibility which are 
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not fairly theirs, and overlook or discount positive accomplish­
ments of great value, that I term their pronouncements “loose 
talk.”
The most notable example appeared recently, embellished 
by a number of cartoons in which a full half of the author’s 
opprobrium is directed at the certified public accountant. No 
certified public accountant’s report could be so replete with 
half-truths, with misconceptions and with errors of omission.
Although its announced intention is to deal with “this business 
of the reports and audits of certified public accountants covering 
companies in which we are asked to invest,” and its concluding 
sentence is “Honest audits are imperative,” still, not more than 
three of its ten sub-captions refer to public accountants, and one 
of those reads “Don’t blame the accountant.” And that con­
cluding sentence, “Honest audits are imperative,” reminds me of 
the ship’s mate who, smarting under a log-reference to his own 
insobriety, found opportunity to write on the ship’s log: “The 
captain was sober today”; absolutely true, but absolutely mis­
leading and utterly unfair.
The article deals principally with the methods of the promoters 
in some of the companies which have so spectacularly collapsed 
during “the years of the locust.” If the general public under­
standing of these methods is anywhere near accurate, they should 
not be condoned. But the attempt to pin on the certified public 
accountant the blame for losses sustained from these crashes, and 
from business failures generally, is not only unfair in conception 
but inept in execution.
In one of these cases, the article says, “the reports of certified 
public accountants fooled everyone.” I submit that this is a 
very loose statement. Let us admit that many people were 
fooled. It does not follow that this includes every reader of the 
reports mentioned. We have no way of knowing how many 
people were kept out of that enterprise because their intelligent 
reading of these very reports warned them away.
It is also complained that the reports “showed that the com­
pany had a surplus of $365,000 when its books failed to show a 
debt of eight million dollars.” What was the character of this 
debt? And what effect would it have had on the surplus if 
shown? These are questions which are not answered. Neither 
does the article indicate how or whether the public accountant 
could have discovered its existence. These oversights indicate 
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that the author was not entirely careful in the preparation of his 
article.
Then there is the story of a plumber who suffered loss because 
he extended credit in reliance on the simple fact that the balance- 
sheet showed a surplus. Now, we can not contemplate anyone’s 
heavy loss with equanimity, but to rest an assertion that this 
victim had been “careful to look at the entire situation before he 
went into it,” and that his loss was attributable to the short­
comings of the certified public accountant, merely on the ground 
that “his eyes glanced down at the—‘surplus account’,” betrays 
an only half-informed realization of the significance of that 
account. Any experienced credit man wants to know more than 
the amount of book surplus before granting requested credit.
The simple fact is that swindles have been perpetrated on the 
public by wildcat financiers. Sometimes they have had the 
temerity to use in their schemes financial statements audited by 
certified public accountants. They have been emboldened to do 
this because some members of the investing public are so gullible 
as to believe that the mere presence of a certified public account­
ant’s report is a guaranty of the integrity of the enterprise, no 
matter what may be said in it. It may be that you, by reason of 
the offices you hold, are particularly interested in this section of 
the investing public; but the public accountant can do no more 
than confirm the accuracy of the information given. He can 
not endow people with the ability to understand what they read.
The article to which I have referred builds up to a suggestion as 
to what a certified public accountant’s report should include, but 
contains nothing new: in almost every particular its recommenda­
tions coincide with the settled opinion of the profession. More 
than sixteen years ago the American Institute of Accountants, at 
the request of the federal trade commission, prepared a mem­
orandum of procedure for verifying financial statements which 
was approved by that commission and by the federal reserve 
board and subsequently published in pamphlet form with several 
reprintings and given wide distribution. After ten years the 
memorandum was revised and it was republished in 1929, again 
as the result of consideration by the American Institute of Ac­
countants and under the imprint of the federal reserve board. 
The pamphlet is entitled Verification of Financial Statements, and 
each of you is probably familiar with it. Any report based on an 
audit conforming to the requirements set forth in that pamphlet 
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will be all that any investor has the right to ask from a certified 
public accountant. I shall shortly give a brief summary of these 
requirements in the hope that you may see what information 
the profession itself has agreed that the investing public should 
have.
If we look to the origin of public accounting practice in this 
country we find foreign capitalists—largely British—sending 
accountants here to get first-hand information as to what was 
being done with their money. Perhaps this is why the earliest 
chartered accountants came from Scotland. But my point is, 
that the public accountants who verified the accounts of an 
enterprise were employed by those who furnished the capital for 
that enterprise. We must come, and we are coming, to that sit­
uation in this country, and I submit that the investing public of 
the United States would be better off today if it had insisted from 
1923 to 1930 that American accountants be sent to Sweden, to 
Germany and to South America for the purpose of seeing what 
was happening to the vast sums of money lent to those countries 
and also had insisted that public accountants of their own choos­
ing be permitted to audit the accounts of even domestic enter­
prises in which they invested. On the domestic side of this 
assertion, it may be that the investors would have chosen the 
same accountants who in fact did audit those enterprises, but it 
would still have been a very different situation.
We must recognize, as President Roosevelt said, that corporate 
management is a trusteeship. The beneficiaries are the investing 
public—investors in the stocks and bonds of the enterprises the 
control of which is committed to the managing trustees. Stock­
holders and bondholders are entitled to have their questions 
answered, or to be told that specific questions are of such import 
that public answers would be detrimental to the enterprise, and 
why. They should not be required to be content with the infor­
mation which management sees fit to give them, supported only 
by the auditor’s certificate that the information, however mean­
ingless, is correct. The greatest difficulty confronting many 
investors is that they are inarticulate—they do not know what 
questions to ask. As a consequence, despite the fact that they 
may be furnished with financial statements, they remain in 
ignorance of the affairs of their company, and, if they are so 
fortunate as to suffer no loss, that fact is due, perhaps to the 
management which may love integrity for its own sake, perhaps 
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to other stockholders sufficiently informed and alert to hold 
management within the paths of rectitude.
Rarely in this country does the public accountant have such a 
relation to the stockholders as to give him other than a moral 
duty to them, and it is to his everlasting credit that he recognizes 
this moral duty so clearly that he is not infrequently required to 
suffer direct financial loss in the performance of it. Of this the 
public seldom hears, but since the newspapers mentioned it quite 
casually it may not be amiss for me to remind you that in a case 
in Illinois this very thing happened—and it was only after prac­
tising public accountants had refused to certify the accounts that 
the company called on an employee who held a C. P. A. certificate 
to do the necessary certifying. Such a pretense to independence 
should not be possible. The federal trade commission, by its 
regulations issued under the new federal securities act, has refused 
to recognize the certificate of a certified or public accountant who 
is employed by or is financially interested in the enterprise whose 
accounts he certifies; and the American Institute of Accountants 
has recently gone on record as holding it improper for a member 
to certify the accounts of a company in which he has a substantial 
financial interest. It is a short step from this point to the propo­
sition that the public accountant must not owe his selection, and 
hence his opportunity to earn his fee, to the very management 
whose accounts are under audit. It is no reflection on the in­
tegrity of the public accountant to say that he should not be 
placed in this embarrassing position. There is no answer to the 
proposition that the public accountant who is to audit a com­
pany’s accounts should be chosen by its stockholders; the state­
ment that they are not competent to make this choice begs the 
question, because even if they do thoughtlessly give their proxies 
to management the situation is still no worse than at present and 
merely indicates that they really are not competent to invest their 
funds in corporate shares. Anyone who is not able and willing to 
give his investments adequate study and supervision should con­
fine them to government bonds or other issues of similar safety 
and low return. Yet unless and until we are willing to forbid 
unlicensed persons to buy stocks and bonds we must regard them 
as competent to perform the functions of stockholders and 
bondholders, and we should take such steps as we can to ensure 
that they be furnished with all proper information to help them 
in doing so. A year ago I was able to find only one jurisdiction 
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in this country—Massachusetts—which gave the stockholders a 
voice in selecting the company auditors; since then Pennsylvania 
has passed a corporation law which requires the auditor to be 
selected by stockholders in the absence of specific by-laws to the 
contrary.
According to the newspapers, the United States Steel Corpora­
tion has voluntarily arranged that its auditors shall be elected by 
the stockholders. I do not believe that this will result in any 
change, either in the personnel of the auditors or in the manner 
in which they discharge their duty to the investors. But it does 
this: it anticipates future emergencies by establishing the auditors 
as independent advisors of the stockholders, co-equal for that 
purpose with the management itself. Regardless of how it may 
affect the present auditors and the present management, it is a 
most desirable safeguard for the future.
There has been considerable discussion with reference to 
published accounts, hung on the question “Whose accounts are 
they?” That is to say, may the auditor revise the statements to 
conform to his views of how they should be presented in order to 
make them effective, or must he content himself with the form 
adopted by the company, and, if he finds the figures correct, so 
certify? Personally, I have leaned to the former view, but I can 
easily understand the latter. Management prepares the finan­
cial statements from the records, then calls in the public account­
ant and says to him, “Audit these records, compare the state­
ments with them, and say whether or not the statements are 
correct.” It is a perfectly honorable engagement which the 
auditor is asked to accept, and a man must mind his belly. If 
the statement of income contains only two figures, “operating 
income” and “net income after all charges,” and the auditor 
finds those two figures correct, there is no reason under our 
system of management-selected auditors why he should not so 
certify. It may or may not occur to the investor in the company 
to seek further information; if he does, he may get it, and if he 
does not he is immediately set down as satisfied with that which 
has been presented. But if the auditor had been elected by the 
stockholders, his instructions would undoubtedly have been to 
some such general effect as this: “Audit the accounts of the com­
pany and tell us what has been done with our money.” These 
instructions would not be satisfied by certifying to the correctness 
of such an income statement. If management would give ade­
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quate recognition to the trust character of its position, it would 
not itself be content with such a statement.
The members of your association are chosen, by election or 
appointment, to represent these inarticulate stockholders. It 
may be that the stockholders would like you to do all their work 
for them, and to make a yes-or-no decision as to whether a given 
security is or is not a good investment, with a guaranty backing 
your affirmative judgment. This, of course, you can not do. 
But you can do much for them by insisting that all necessary 
information be available to those investors who are able and 
willing to use it, withholding your permission for the sale of 
securities whose issuers have not furnished such information to be 
made available to investors. Some investors may not be able to 
utilize it, but some can, and the mere fact that it must be prepared 
and filed in your offices, where it will be available to the public, 
will have a salutary effect on management.
Just what this information should be will of course vary so 
greatly in different cases as to make almost every enterprise 
unique. But the old cry that the information will be used by 
competitors to the company’s detriment should not be given too 
great weight. An enterprise which looks to the public for capital 
ought not to be using that capital in such fashion that it would be 
jeopardized by publicity. The final report of the auditors who 
last year investigated the affairs of Kreuger & Toll, after Ivan 
Kreuger’s death, contains this very pertinent comment: “The 
history of this group of companies emphasizes anew the truth that 
enterprises in which complete secrecy on the part of the chief 
executive officer as to the way in which important parts of the 
capital are employed is, or is alleged to be, essential to success 
are fundamentally unsuited for public investment, since such 
secrecy undermines all ordinary safeguards and affords to the 
dishonest executive unequalled opportunity for the perpetration 
and concealment of frauds.”
If the stockholders were to select the auditors, these latter 
might well advise the stockholders that information of interest 
to them was being withheld from published statements because 
its publication was deemed by the management to be detrimental 
to the best interests of the company. Then if there were a 
sufficient number of stockholders interested in determining the 
company’s policies they could order the divulgence of this in­
formation, and the auditor would be secure in his position. If 
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such stockholders were a minority in a large company, the news­
papers might safely be relied upon to give publicity to the con­
troversy, as they did recently in one case with the result that 
finally a majority of the stockholders was aroused to action. If, 
on the other hand, the stockholders should agree to accept such 
information as was tendered them and not to ask for more, they 
would still be in the position of having made the final decision as 
to how much information they wanted.
I have no doubt that you are all acquainted with the regis­
tration-statement form prescribed by the federal trade commis­
sion under the new federal securities act, but I should like to 
point out some of its major provisions, all of which are in accord 
with the bulletin prepared by the American Institute of Account­
ants and published by the federal reserve board, to which I have 
previously referred.
First, fixed-asset accounts must be so set up in the balance- 
sheet as to show cost, book appreciation and provision for 
depreciation, all separately;
Second, intangibles must be separated from other assets 
and the basis of valuation disclosed;
Third, investments in subsidiary or affiliated companies 
must be separated from other investments, and the basis of 
valuation of each disclosed;
Fourth, the amounts of both receivables and bad debt 
reserves must be shown, not merely the net receivables after 
deducting the reserves;
Fifth, the basis for valuation of inventories must be 
declared and should preferably be the lower of cost or market;
Sixth, the market as well as book values of marketable 
securities must be shown, and indebtedness of officers or 
stockholders and of affiliated companies must also be segre­
gated from other current assets;
Seventh, liabilities must be classified in such detail as to 
show priorities both of lien and maturity;
Eighth, the proceeds of issue must be shown for all classes 
of capital stock, and the source and amount of each element 
of surplus must be set forth clearly;
Ninth, gross sales and details of cost of goods sold are 
requested to be stated, although not required if the company 
will be injured thereby;
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Tenth, charges for bad-debt-loss provisions, fixed-asset 
maintenance, taxes and depreciation must be shown sepa­
rately; the new regulations also require in another place 
detailed information regarding compensation paid to officers, 
and it might be well to include the total amount so paid as a 
separate charge in the income statement;
Eleventh, extraordinary and non-recurring revenues and 
expenses must be separated from others and clearly de­
scribed ; and
Twelfth, there must be a statement showing all changes 
in surplus during the period covered by the income statement.
There is, of course, much more in the work of the public ac­
countant than the arranging of items in the balance-sheet and 
statement of income and surplus in such fashion as to bring out 
the facts which investors are entitled to know. The bulletin of 
the federal reserve board, Verification of Financial Statements, 
contains a detailed manual of sound auditing procedure, the 
following of which would place the auditor in position to know the 
character of his materials before he begins to assemble the finan­
cial statements or to test such statements previously prepared 
by the company under audit. It would be very pertinent for 
securities commissioners to make inquiry of a public accountant 
whose certificate is presented to them in support of financial 
statements filed with applications for permission to sell securities 
as to whether or not before issuing such certificate he had made 
an audit conforming in all particulars to the procedure laid down 
in that bulletin. In many cases the management of companies 
under audit has been unable or unwilling to see the reason for 
some of the steps of audit procedure which are laid down in that 
bulletin and has required the auditor to forego such steps. If an 
inquiry made by a securities commissioner should develop this 
as a fact, the commissioner might well judge as to the sufficiency 
of the audit with the specified steps omitted. When you consider 
the fact that the public accountant is engaged in the first instance 
by management you will recognize that he is under compulsion to 
accept such restrictions with the single alternative of refusing 
the engagement. In the latter case it is not improbable that the 
work will be done by others with a lower ethical ideal and with 
less regard for the rights of investors to full and complete infor­
mation. Thus it is better to accept the engagement in spite of 
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those restrictions and to do the utmost for investors which is 
possible under the terms of employment.
The public accountant who has been selected by the stock­
holders of a corporation, independent of its management, to audit 
its accounts, which constitute a record of that management’s 
stewardship, will obviously enjoy an improved position and a 
greater independence, with benefit resulting not only to the 
stockholders but to bondholders and other investors as well. In 
years gone by trust indentures underlying bond issues frequently 
contained a provision to the effect that the accounts of the 
issuing company should be audited by a certified public account­
ant selected by or at least acceptable to the trustee, with the 
result that the public accountant knew that his engagement 
depended on his doing work and rendering a report which would 
be satisfactory to the trustee as a representative of the bond­
holders. With the increase in the amount of public financing 
done by issuance of preferred and common stock and with the 
growth of the practice on the part of corporations to have their 
accounts audited by public accountants selected by the manage­
ment, this practice of having the auditors in a sense selected by 
the trustee for the bondholders has fallen into disuse. It might 
well be revived.
I have tried to show the importance of having the public 
accountant selected by and responsible to those who have fur­
nished the capital of the enterprise to be audited, that is to say the 
investing public, and to indicate the type of information which he 
should be required to give for the benefit of the investing public. 
It is important that the investing public should have this infor­
mation, which can be supplied to it only through properly pre­
pared financial statements, but a word of caution is necessary 
lest this information be regarded by some as all sufficient. That 
word of caution was most eloquently spoken by the American 
Institute’s committee on cooperation with stock exchanges in a 
report which was made public last winter. The committee said:
“But even when all has been done that can be done, the limita­
tions on the significance of even the best of accounts must be 
recognized, and the shorter the period covered by them the more 
pronounced usually are these limitations. Accounts are essen­
tially continuous historical records; and, as is true of history in 
general, correct interpretations and sound forecasts for the future 
can not be reached upon a hurried survey of temporary condi­
tions, but only by longer retrospect and a careful distinction
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between permanent tendencies and transitory influences. If 
the investor is unable or unwilling to make or secure an adequate 
survey, it will be best for him not to rely on the results of a 
superficial one.”
The extent of the public accountant’s financial responsibility 
to the investing public has entered what appears likely to be a 
long-drawn-out process of determination. It has been held that 
the public accountant is liable for damages if guilty of such 
palpable negligence as to amount to fraud on the investing 
public even though there be no fraudulent intent. Provisions for 
such financial responsibility on the part of the public accountant 
are included in the new federal securities act. Many public 
accountants feel that these provisions are of such drastic charac­
ter as to defeat their own purpose by imposing a risk too great for 
a careful and solvent public accountant to assume. Under this 
new law it is conceivable that a public accountant with sufficient 
temerity to certify financial statements will find that he has 
risked his entire personal fortune, not only on his skill and ability 
as an auditor, but on his ability to demonstrate to a jury of 
laymen that his highly technical work was done honestly and 
with reasonable care and ability. The unfairness of putting the 
public accountant in this position will be seen most clearly when 
you consider that even if he succeeds in his defense he still will 
have incurred heavy expenses for which no provision can possibly 
be made in fixing the amount of his audit fee. He is put in a 
position where he must even sustain attacks brought in bad faith, 
with no penalty imposed upon his accuser when he utterly fails 
to make out a case. This risk on the public accountant’s part 
would certainly seem to be disproportionate, and it is to be hoped 
that a way may be found to permit him to perform his very 
valuable function without being thus overburdened.
The investing public has a right to look to the public account­
ant for skill, judgment and integrity of a high order, and the 
public accountant similarly has a right to expect of the investing 
public a recognition of the unavoidable limitations on his work 
and a fair and thorough study of what he submits as a result of it. 
Thus and only thus can the two groups be mutually helpful.
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